Marital fertility and wealth in transition era France, 1750-1850 by Cummins, Neil
Marital fertility and wealth in transition era France,
1750-1850
Neil Cummins
To cite this version:
Neil Cummins. Marital fertility and wealth in transition era France, 1750-1850. PSE Working
Papers n2009-16. 2009. <halshs-00566843>
HAL Id: halshs-00566843
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00566843
Submitted on 17 Feb 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2009 - 16 
 
 
 
Marital fertility and wealth 
 
in transition era France, 1750-1850 
 
 
 
 
Neil Cummins 
 
 
 
 
 JEL Codes: N33, J13, D31 
 Keywords: economic history, fertility decline, France, 
family economics, wealth, inequality, social mobility 
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
LABORATOIRE D’ECONOMIE APPLIQUÉE - INRA 
 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
Marital Fertility and Wealth in 
Transition Era France, 1750-1850 
 
Neil Cummins, Dept. of Economic History, LSE 
n.j.cummins@lse.ac.uk
 
Abstract 
 
The spectacularly early decline of French fertility is one of the 
great puzzles of economic history. There are no convincing 
explanations for why France entered a fertility transition over a 
century before anywhere else in the world. This analysis links highly 
detailed individual level fertility life histories to wealth at death data 
for four rural villages in transition-era France, 1750-1850. The results 
show that it was the richest groups who reduced their family size 
first and that they used ‘spacing’ strategies to achieve this. In cross 
section, measures of the environment for social mobility are strongly 
associated with the fertility decline. The evidence presented here 
demonstrates that socioeconomic status mattered during the early 
French fertility decline. This study is a first step towards re-
establishing the French experience as paramount in our 
understanding of Europe’s demographic transition. 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Economic explanations for the European fertility transition, 
such as demographic transition theory (Notestein 1945), micro 
economic theory (Becker 1960, 1991) and more recently unified 
growth theory (Galor 2004) have treated the early French fertility 
decline as ‘noise’, the extreme tail end of a normal distribution. This 
is the intellectual equivalent of treating Britain as the exception in 
explaining the Industrial Revolution1. At the time fertility fell (apx. 
1800), France was by far the largest country in Europe, excluding 
Russia, with a population of almost 30 million people representing 
27.7% of the total population of Western Europe (calculated from 
Maddison 2003).  
 
This analysis links highly detailed individual level fertility life 
histories to wealth at death data for four rural villages in transition-
era France. The period of analysis is approximately 1750-1850 (based 
on those who died 1810-70). The study presented here is the first to 
analyze the wealth-fertility relationship during the period of the 
French fertility decline. The quality of the data collected allows for 
an in-depth investigation of the wealth-fertility relationship between 
different demographic regimes, the mechanics behind these patterns 
and also allows the testing of various hypotheses for why fertility 
declined in France.  
 
Background 
 
                                                 
1 Comparison borrowed from Van de Walle 1974 p.5. 
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Over the past two centuries, fertility in most of the World has 
undergone a sustained and seemingly irreversible transition. Today, a 
low fertility regime is the norm in the developed world, with some 
regions (particularly in Europe) experiencing sub-replacement 
fertility. This demographic transition enabled the productivity 
advances of the Industrial Revolution to be transformed into higher 
living standards and sustained economic growth. Understanding the 
revolution in fertility behavior between the Malthusian and the 
modern eras has therefore been a central research question. Despite 
this interest, researchers of the transition have not approached a 
consensus for the causal mechanisms behind the decline of fertility.  
 
The European fertility project (EFP) led by Ainsley Coale at 
Princeton University during the 1970s and ‘80s set out to provide an 
empirical base for demographic transition theory. However, the EFP 
concluded that the decline of marital fertility during the late 19th 
century was almost completely unrelated to socioeconomic changes 
(Coale and Watkins 1986). Time (the decade of the 1890s), as 
opposed to any socio-economic measure, was the best indicator for 
the onset of sustained fertility decline. Therefore, the transition was 
an ‘ideational change’ and not an economic adaptation. Recent 
criticisms have somewhat diluted the authority of the Princeton view. 
Brown and Guinnane (2007) argue that the EFP’s conclusions were 
biased by the level of aggregation. The sub-national districts used 
(departments, counties, cantons etc.) were too large and internally 
heterogeneous to be useful as distinct fertility regimes. Further, the 
socioeconomic data collected was not the most relevant to parent’s 
fertility decisions.  
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The implications for further research are clear: To go beyond 
the EFP two issues must be addressed. Firstly, the level of 
aggregation, and secondly, the relevance of the socioeconomic data. 
The study presented here directly addresses these two concerns via 
an individual level analysis of fertility behavior with real wealth 
information.  
 
Figure 1: The index of Marital Fertility, 1740-1911, France 
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Source: Weir 1994 p.330-1 
A central feature of the European demographic transition is the 
exceptional early fertility decline of France. The reasons for this 
spectacular break from the historical pattern and divergence from 
European trends have never been fully explained. Figure 1 tracks the 
trend of the index of marital fertility – fertility relative to an observed 
maximum (that of an early twentieth century religious group, the 
Hutterites, who married early and prohibited contraception). From 
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the late 18th century on, fertility appears to begin a steady and 
consistent decline from very high levels (80-90% of the Hutterites) 
to very low levels (almost 30% of the Hutterites). Econometric 
testing for structural breaks in this series places the transition at 
1776. This is nearly a century before anywhere else in Europe 
(Belgium (1874)), and 101 years before England and Wales (1877) 
(see Cummins 2009 (forthcoming) for details).  
 
There have been relatively few previous studies of the 
relationship between economic status and family size at the 
individual level for France at this period. Weir, using the Henry 
demographic data, examined the income-fertility relationship in 
Rosny-Sous-Bois, using tax records for 1747. In a cross-sectional 
analysis, he found no difference in marital fertility behavior between 
the income groupings.  Fertility was high and varied little between his 
three income stratifications, although the evidence does suggest a 
reproductive advantage for his highest group relative to his lowest 
(7.3 to 6.2 births per family respectively) (Weir 1995 p.15). Weir’s 
sample size was very small however – he only had a total sample of 
47 families to analyze. Hadeishi, with a larger sample size and also 
using tax records, studied the town of Nuits in Burgundy from 1744-
1792, and found a positive relationship between marital fertility and 
income (2003 p.489). My analysis adds to this literature by linking 
pre-existing historical demographic data to new wealth data collected 
from various Archives Departmentales in France. The geographic and 
socioeconomic scope, along with the sample size, is far greater than 
previous studies. This will allow the identification of differential 
fertility patterns between socioeconomic strata with greater power. 
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Further, there has been no previous study (to the author’s 
knowledge) which has examined the wealth-fertility relationship 
during the period of the demographic transition in France (post 
1790s).  
 
The rest of this paper is comprised of five sections. Section 2 
details the data and its summary characteristics. Section 3 is a detailed 
examination of the wealth-fertility associations. Section 4 analyses 
the mechanics behind the fertility patterns, while section 5 evaluates 
explanations for the French fertility transition. Section 6 Concludes. 
 
Section 2: The Data 
 
The demographic data2 to be analysed is taken from Louis 
Henry’s national random sample of 41 villages, roughly covering a 
span of over two centuries, from the late 17th to early 19th centuries 
(Weir 1995 p.2). This dataset3 is the result of the application of the 
techniques of family reconstitution to parish registers and the 
fruition of this is a goldmine of individual level information on the 
demographic characteristics of historical France. Tens of thousands 
of observations record linked births, deaths and marriages. However, 
only 20% of the sample recorded the husband’s occupation. As van 
de Walle has stated “unfortunately, the population of the parishes 
usually is not clearly stratified and most attempts in finding lags in 
the dates of fertility decline by socioeconomic groups have failed” 
(1978 p.264). To understand the relationship between wealth and 
                                                 
2 I thank George Alter for providing his version of the Henry dataset. 
3 The summary papers for the INED French family reconstitution are: 
Henry (1972), Henry and Houdaille (1973), Houdaille (1976), and Henry (1978). 
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fertility in France at this period, the Henry dataset must be 
augmented with more detailed data. 
 
The source for wealth data are the Tables des Successions et 
Absences4 (TSA), which are stored in the various Archives 
Departmentales in France. The TSAs were originally constructed for 
tax purposes and recorded all deaths in a locality, along with detailed 
information on date of death, residence, profession, age at death and 
marital status. Uniquely, the value of an individual’s estate at death 
was noted, with a distinction between cash and property holdings. 
Crucially, the TSAs recorded everybody, including those with zero 
assets at death (typically coded as “rien”). Almost ¼ of the 
individuals in the sample I use fall into this category.  
 
Due to the fact that the property valuation recorded in the TSAs 
only covered property held in the locality, it is possible that the 
values calculated here are underestimates of the true property wealth 
of individuals. However, this bias only affects a small minority of the 
sample. According to Bordieu et al, 85% of individuals in the “TRA” 
sample (also based on the TSAs) had one property record, leaving 
15% with two or more (2004 p.7). Attempts to assess the accuracy of 
the wealth information in the TSAs are limited by the fact that “very 
few alternative sources exist” (Bourdieu et al. 2004 p.25). However, 
Bourdieu et al. test the validity of the Tables against other published 
data and find the TSA to yield consistent results (2004 p.26).  
                                                 
4 In English: “Tables of Bequests and Absent Persons” (Bourdieu et al. 2004 p.4). 
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Figure 2: Villages in the Sample 
 
The Henry demographic data set was linked to records from the 
Tables des Successions et Absences. The links were based upon name, 
profession, sex, age at death and date of death. These criteria serve 
to place close to 100% certainty in the accuracy of the links. 
Ultimately, four villages were selected on the basis that they were the 
best represented after linking. These villages had the properties of 
holding a significant number of individuals dying after 1810 (when 
the TSAs start to record estimates of wealth), and also having the 
TSAs preserved in the relevant Archive Departmental.  
 
The sample covers the fertility experience of individuals who died 
roughly between 1810 and 1870 and were born between the 1720s 
and the 1820s. The relevant ‘fertile period’ covered is therefore 1750-
1850, roughly speaking. At this time approximately 80% of the 
French population lived in rural villages of a similar size to those in  
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the sample (Coale and Watkins 1986 p.235). Fertility decline in 
France cannot be understood without understanding what was 
happening in these rural villages. However, the sample villages are 
only 4 out of perhaps 40,000 villages in France as a whole. The 
occupational distribution of these sample villages closely matched 
that of the complete Henry Sample (41 villages). The deviations in 
representativeness are detailed in the appendix.  In order to judge 
how representative the demographic regimes in these villages are, 
their fertility pattern relative to the National trend is plotted in figure 
3. 
 
The National trend in (the index of marital fertility), 
presented in figure 3, shows a sharp decline from high levels in the 
1780-99 period. Interestingly, the sample villages display a high level 
of heterogeneity with respect to the trend in marital fertility. Rosny 
has exceptionally high marital fertility which then proceeds to decline 
dramatically from 1760-79 period to the post 1780s. Both Cabris and 
St Paul have relatively low levels of marital fertility (to the other 
villages and the National trend), with a trend towards decline evident 
in Cabris from the 1740-1759 period.  
gI
 
The initial trend towards decline in St Paul stalls after 1760, and 
along with St Chely, whose fertility remains high throughout, no 
trend towards sustained decline is evident. The sample villages 
capture the high level of heterogeneity within France with respect to 
fertility patterns. Two of the villages – Rosny and Cabris – show  
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 Figure 3: The Index of Marital Fertility, by Sample Village, 
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clear evidence for decline, while the other two – St Paul and St Chely 
– do not share the same pattern. Examining the trend from the 
1760-79 period to 1800-1819, we see that fertility in Rosny falls by 
nearly 40% and in Cabris by almost 20%. In St Chely and St Paul, 
fertility remains relatively constant. Therefore it is possible to 
identify two demographic regimes amongst the sample villages, a 
high fertility environment and a declining fertility environment. For 
the analysis, the data from each village will be pooled and the varying 
wealth effects will be tested for by demographic regime.  
 
 10
 Figure 4: Life Course Effects 
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The wealth variable used in this study has the major 
disadvantage of being measured at death. In aggregate, people tend 
to accumulate wealth over the life cycle, before dissaving and 
intervivos bequests to offspring act to reduce the wealth held. This 
will have the effect of biasing the estimates from the TSA 
downward, with respect to true wealth, for those who died after this 
point. The data I use supports this notion, as the figure 4 illustrates 
(based on 672 male observations). 
 
An OLS regression was run with the Square root of real wealth 
as the dependent variable, with age and age squared as the 
independent variables. The results are reported in table 1. The 
reported coefficients on age at death, which are both significant at  
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 Table 1: OLS Regression on the Square Root of Real Wealth 
Variable Coeff. SE P 
Age at Death 2.04 0.96 0.03 
Age at Death  
Squared -0.016 0.007 0.03 
Constant -20.8 29.5 .48 
 
Adjusted  
R-Squared 0.004 
Observations 672 
 
the 5% level, indicate a turning point age of 63.755, beyond which 
the relationship between wealth and age at death turns negative. 
There is a possibility that the life course pattern of wealth 
accumulation and subsequent decline may blur the true level of 
wealth of an individual in the sample. However, I consider this 
probability quite small as the slope of the line is so flat. There are no 
significant negative associations revealed by the analysis of the 
aggregate data between the level of real wealth and age at death. In 
total over 60% of the sample died above 64, and taking their value of 
wealth at death carries a risk of undervaluation due to the life course 
effects. The OLS regression on the square root of real wealth allows 
us to calculate an average bias (assuming the true level of wealth is 
reached at age 64) based on the average life course relationship 
between wealth and age6.  
 
                                                 
5 Equivalent to the point on the quadratic fit of the wealth and age observations 
where the slope is equal to zero. Calculated via differentiating the regression 
equation of the quadratic fit, setting equal to zero, and solving for age at death. 
6 These numbers are calculated using the deviation of the regression line from a 
flat line from age 64 onwards.  
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While the majority of the sample is at risk from underestimation 
of true wealth due to life course effects, any serious bias (>10%) is 
likely to only affect less than 5% of the sample. Ultimately the 
analysis presented here will split the wealth distribution in three. The 
possibility of bias from underestimation must be considered minimal 
as a result of such a wide division of the sample. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Biases from Life Course Effects 
Estimated Possible  
Downward Bias 
Affected  
Age Groups Obs 
% of Sample 
 affected 
5%+ 64-98 421 61.61% 
10%+ 86-98 42 4.32% 
20%+ 95-98 4 0.15% 
 
There is a statistically insignificant effect of year of death on 
Real Wealth, with a linear fit completely flat for the sample period 
(figure 5). For analysis, the sample will be split into three wealth 
groups. As there was no time trend in the evolution of real wealth 
during this period, the division of wealth is calculated over the entire 
sample, disregarding sub-period. The choice of three wealth cuts 
follows Weir (1995) and Gutmann and Watkins (1990), and makes 
sense when we consider that these villages were primarily agricultural 
and the socio-economic stratification, as perceived by the population 
themselves, was probably relatively simple. The division split the 
sample into even thirds, with those dying with  the sum of  0-141 
Francs been designated to group 1, those with wealth at death 
between 141 and 2,100 Francs designated into group 2, and those 
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with a wealth at over 2,100 been designated to group 37. The 
nominal levels of wealth reported in the Tables were converted to real 
levels using a cost of living index from Lévy-Leboyer & 
Bourguignon (1990)8.  
 
Figure 5: Real Wealth by Year of Death (Males) 
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Raw Wealth Correlations 
 
Table 3 reports the average number of children born and the 
number of children surviving to 10 (‘net family size’). These values 
represent the actual gross and net reproductive success between the 
wealth groups. The different demographic regimes have very 
                                                 
 
 
8 Which was kindly supplied to me by Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur 
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different wealth-fertility relationships. Where fertility is high and 
unchanging, the wealth-fertility relationship is positive. The Richest 
group here has a family size over 21% larger than the poorest (over 
30% if we measure this in ‘net’ terms). Where fertility is declining, 
the wealth fertility relationship is the reverse. The differential 
between the richest and the poorest group’s family size is now minus 
30%! (23% in ‘net’ terms). The varying family sizes of the sample 
follow a clear and direct wealth-pattern, once we control for the type 
of fertility regime revealed by the aggregate trends.  
 
Table 3: Average Children Born and Surviving to 10 Years, 
per Wealth Group 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages   
Children Ever Born 4.87 5.90 5.93 
Net Family Size 3.42 4.03 4.47 
Decline Villages    
Children Ever Born 5.50 4.88 3.88 
Net Family Size 4.62 4.14 3.57 
 
The raw averages discussed above say nothing on the mechanics 
of the fertility differentials between the groups.  How was the lower 
cross sectional fertility of the rich achieved in those villages where 
fertility was declining? Further, why was fertility so low amongst the 
poorest groups in the villages where fertility was not declining? 
Malthusian logic would immediately propose the female age at 
marriage, the classic European ‘preventative’ check as the driver 
behind these patterns. Also, differential female mortality between the 
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wealth groups could be generating a lot of the variation. Does the 
perceived wealth effect act through these channels? The following 
section details regressions designed to detect the wealth effects 
controlling for these demographic variables and also event dummies 
such as the French Revolution.   
 
Section 3: Deconstructing the Wealth Effects 
 
The equations below detail the components of net family size. 
Any wealth effects on net family size have to operate through 
differentials in these values.  
 
)50,,,min(
*
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Where is net family size,  and  are children 
ever born and died respectively, 
NetF CEB CED
MFR is the marital fertility rate, 
MD is the duration of the marriage, is the end of the union 
(marriage),  is the husbands age at death, and 
 are female age at marriage and death respectively.  
EU
MAgeD FAgeM
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Further, it can be expected that other forces, operating at the 
village level, and also at the national level (for instance the 
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Revolution and the effects of the Napoleonic wars), have a influence 
upon individual’s fertility choices . To examine the specific wealth 
effects in the sample, a regression framework was established. 
 
The model to be estimated takes the following functional form: 
 
),,,,,,,.( WealthIMNWARsREVFageDFageMDCCEBf ii  
 
Where  represents a constant, C D is a fertility regime fixed effect, 
 represents a measure of infant mortality, and and 
are categorical variables representing the Revolution and 
Napoleonic wars respectively. The last mentioned ‘event’ variables 
were coded relative to year of marriage, with those with a year of 
marriage in 1789 or later receiving a Revolution effect, and those 
married between 1802 and 1814 receiving a war effect. The 
variable is included in the regression as a categorical variable 
in order to account for expected non-linearities in the wealth fertility 
relationship.  
IM REV
NWARs
Wealth
 
Any analysis of fertility must account for the impact of child 
deaths upon parent’s fertility decisions. Further, these child mortality 
estimates must take into account the significant likelihood of the 
omission of child deaths in the death registers. A popular way to 
detect under registration in death records is to examine the frequency 
of first name repetition within a family. Typically, later born siblings 
would be given the name of a previously deceased child. Houdaille 
has conducted an in-depth analysis of the Henry dataset for these 
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features. However, his results are based on the village level and will 
tell us nothing on the wealth differentials within the villages with 
respect to infant and child mortality. One result that is relevant here 
is the completeness of the death records in Rosny, where no under 
registration was detected at all (Houdaille 1984 p.88). For this study, 
I employed a simple version of this technique. First, I counted up the 
number of repeated names within a family. This was then compared 
with the number of recorded child deaths. Where the number of 
repeated names exceeded the number of child deaths, I corrected the 
child deaths upwards to account for the probable omission of a 
death from the records. Table 4 reports the corrected and non 
orrected values by fertility regime and wealth division.  
 
 their rate is half that of 
the richest group in the non-decline villages.  
ositive 
correlation between fertility and mortality (Guinnane et al. 
 
c
There are huge differences in child mortality between the 
villages. Within those were fertility is high, child mortality is high too. 
Within the villages, child mortality varies to a far less extent, with 
almost no differences between the wealth groups where fertility is 
high. The wealthiest group in the decline villages have child mortality 
far below any other group in the sample, and
 
Is the decline in fertility related to a reduction in child mortality 
at this period? To examine this, I will proceed with a multivariate 
regression. There is a probable endogenous relationship between 
fertility and infant mortality. Firstly, the number of child deaths can 
never exceed the number of births. This induces a p
 18
Table 4: Child Mortality (until 10 years) by Fertility Regime 
and Wealth Group, Rates per 1000 births 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages   
Corrected 326.8 342.1 335.1 
Uncorrected 283.1 320.6 314.2 
Decline Villages    
Corrected 201.5 211.0 166.6 
Uncorrected 181.2 197.9 162.0 
 
 
2006 p. 472). Secondly, parents may choose to replace a deceased 
infant. Any interpretation of a parent’s gross family size must 
therefore factor in the effects of the mortality experience. Following 
Guinnane et al., I factor in mortality by including the proportion of 
children dead as an independent variable in the regression. This 
removes the structural correlation between mortality and fertility but 
does not remove the endogenity. 
 
As the dependant variable is a count variable and because the 
data is ‘over dispersed’ relative to the Poisson distribution, the 
appropriate method is to use negative binomial regression. The  
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions on Children Ever 
Born 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Demographic variables  
Age at Marriage, Female -0.038*** 
(0.005) 
Age at Death, Female 0.035*** 
(0.004) 
Proportion of Children dead 0.269** 
(0.001) 
Event variables  
Revolution -0.149** 
(0.059) 
Napoleonic Wars -.043 
(0.054) 
Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 0.181* 
(0.049) 
Wealth Group3 0.145 
(0.093) 
Wealth-Fertility Regime Interactions  
Main Decline Effect 0.085 
(0.078) 
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 -0.291** 
(0.102) 
Wealth Group3 -0.397*** 
(0.104) 
Constant .945*** 
(0.252) 
N 411 
Psuedo R2 0.088 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at .05% level 
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distribution of both gross and net fertility matched the negative 
binomial distribution closely, and a comparison with the Poisson 
distribution is detailed in the appendix.  
 
Table 5 details the results of a negative binomial regression on 
children ever born. Female age at marriage and at death are highly 
significant and act in the expected directions9. The proportion of 
dead children is also highly significant and it’s effect is large. 
Intended to capture the effects of infant mortality, a reduction in this 
value decreases the number of children born. The Revolution has a 
significant negative effect on fertility, but the Napoleonic wars are 
insignificant. The wealth effects are capture by interactions in the 
model, and their ‘net’ effects are reported in table 6. 
 
Table 6: Net Wealth Effects on Children ever born 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages 5.95 7.14 6.88 
Decline Villages 6.48 5.81 5.04 
 
The ‘net’ wealth effects on fertility in table 6 are calculated from 
the interaction coefficients in the negative binomial regressions. A 
constant age at marriage for females (24) and complete life course 
fertility (surviving to at least 50) is applied for each wealth group10.  
These values represent the wealth effects on fertility ‘net’ of wealth 
differentials in age at marriage, death and the proportion of children 
                                                 
9 Women who marry later should have fewer children for biological reasons, and 
women who die during their reproductive years should have fewer children.  
10 The average age at marriage for all women in the sample as a whole was 23.8. 
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dead. Once the net effect is calculated for each wealth group, the 
coefficient is exponentiated (as the beta coefficients of the negative 
binomial regression are given in logarithms) to give the expected 
numbers for each wealth group.  These numbers can be understood 
as representing the net wealth effects controlling for the factors 
listed in the regression, and ignoring the effects of the Revolution 
and Napoleonic Wars. In relation to the richest and poorest groups, 
the strong positive wealth fertility relationship almost completely 
disappears within the non-decline villages. Those in the middle of the 
wealth distribution in the non-decline villages – Wealth Group 2, 
appear to have the highest marital fertility. Where fertility decline has 
already begun, the net wealth fertility relationship is still sharply 
negative, with the richest groups having over 22% fewer births. In 
summation: Pre-transition villages have a positive wealth-fertility 
profile, whereas transition villages have a negative wealth-fertility 
profile. This strongly implies that it is the rich, the top third of the 
wealth distribution in these rural villages, who are the pioneers of the 
decline in French fertility. 
 
 
As mentioned, one feature the regression results highlight is the 
high relative fertility of Wealth Group 2 in the non-decline villages. 
One postulation on this feature could be that a proportion of the 
richest groups in the non-decline villages are beginning to control their 
fertility, but this proportion is too small to move the size of the 
wealth effect below that of the poorest group.  The quality of the 
Henry dataset allows us to examine in fine detail the mechanics of 
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the wealth fertility differentials, and this is described in the next 
section.  
 
Section 4: The Mechanics behind the Fertility Patterns 
 
The results from the regressions demonstrate systematically that 
economic status mattered during the period of fertility decline in 
France. What were the mechanics behind these patterns? The 
regressions indicate that both the gross family size correlations with 
wealth were independent of marriage age and age at death. The 
significant negative association, particularly for Rosny and Cabris 
(the ‘decline regime’ villages) for marriages after 1800, must therefore 
represent an implementation of fertility limitation strategies within 
marriage. There are two ways for couples to control their desired 
family size. Firstly, they can stop bearing children once they reach  a 
certain target family size – this is known as ‘stopping’ behavior . 
Secondly, they can increase their birth intervals–‘spacing’ behavior . 
The European demographic transition has overwhelmingly been 
attributed to ‘stopping behavior ’.  However, the aggregation of 
those pursuing different reproductive strategies may blur the true 
picture. As van Bavel has stated; “research explicitly analyzing 
stopping and spacing has hardly ever differentiated between social 
status groups” (2002 p.7). The French fertility patterns discussed 
here are delineated by economic categories, and this section evaluates 
to what extent stopping and spacing can be attributed.  
 
‘Stopping’ Behaviour 
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The  Henry demographic dataset allows the calculation of 
fertility measures such as Age Specific Fertility Rates, Coale’s index 
of marital fertility, the Total Marital Fertility Rate and the Coale and 
Trussell fertility control measures “M” and “m” (referred to as big 
and little m respectively). The Coale-Trussell parameters are 
calculated from the Age Specific Fertility Rates and represent 
deviations from the age pattern of ‘natural fertility’. An M value of 1, 
and an ‘m’ value of 0 indicate no fertility control. Typically, 
researchers look for an ‘m’ value greater than .200 for an 
unambiguous sign of a controlling population. M, is harder to 
interpret, but may catch ‘spacing’ effects. The appendix details the 
statistical derivation of the Coale-Trussell parameters.  However, 
these measures have been criticized in the literature and are far from 
fool proof. Table 7 summarizes the calculated Age specific marital 
fertility rates, Total Marital Fertility Rates and the Coale and Trussell 
fertility control parameters.  
 
The reproductive advantage of the richest group in the non-decline 
villages is emphasized by the high value for M, 0.927. This means 
that the richest group here has a fertility level very close to that of 
the natural fertility schedule. For the non-decline villages, M has 
decreased and the scale of the decrease is, again, closely related to 
economic status. The richest have the lowest level of fertility and the 
poorest wealth group have the highest. Focusing on ‘m’ – the 
parameter indicating significant deviation from a natural age pattern 
of marital fertility, the results indicate no unambiguous signs for 
stopping behavior in any of the regimes. However, this value is 
largest for the richest group in the decline villages (0.146). Despite  
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Table 7: Demographic Measures by Fertility Regime 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non-decline Villages 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-25 0.364 0.313 0.373 
25-30 0.357 0.360 0.432 
30-35 0.302 0.389 0.349 
35-40 0.268 0.321 0.303 
40-45 0.155 0.176 0.158 
45-50 0.008 0.027 0.000 
Total Marital Fertility 7.75 8.43 8.70 
Coale Trussell Measures 
M 0.802* 0.795** 0.927 
S.E. 0.105 0.087 0.092 
"m" 0.029 -0.141 0.064 
S.E. 0.119 0.095 0.113 
Decline Villages 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-25 0.302 0.250 0.216 
25-30 0.343 0.313 0.261 
30-35 0.313 0.273 0.228 
35-40 0.242 0.209 0.164 
40-45 0.133 0.100 0.084 
45-50 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Total Marital Fertility 7.58 6.82 5.86 
Coale Trussell Measures 
M 0.768** 0.682*** 0.587*** 
S.E. 0.096 0.085 0.087 
"m" 0.058 0.104 0.146 
S.E. 0.107 0.099 0.100 
failing to be significant and above the 0.200 threshold, the value is 
indicative of a small proportion of ‘stoppers’. 
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 Another way to detect ‘stopping’ behavior  is to look at the 
average age women have their last birth. These values are reported 
for the regime and wealth group combinations in table 8. The values 
are calculated only for those women and their husbands who died 
after 50.  The mean age at last birth in populations practicing ‘natural 
fertility’ is approximately 40-41 years (Bongaarts (1983) as cited by 
Kohler et al. 2002 p.28). Amongst the villages where fertility was not 
declining, there is no significant variation to report. Age at last birth 
is high, around 37-38 years for all wealth groups. For the villages 
where fertility was declining, the top 2 wealth groups do show 
evidence for ‘stopping’ behavior ; the mean age at last birth is 
significantly below that of the other groups in the sample.  
 
Table 8: Age at Last Birth by Fertility Regime 
 Wealth Group 
 
 
1 2 3 
Non-Decline  Villages 37.81 38.62 36.92 
Decline Villages 37.80 35.90 35.37 
 
‘Spacing’ behavior  
 
Having established some partial evidence for the presence of 
‘stopping’ behavior amongst the wealthiest groups in the sample 
villages, the question of ‘spacing’ arises. It is far easier to detect 
‘stopping’ behavior in population sub-groups then it is to detect 
‘spacing’ behavior. One way to detect spacing is to model the birth 
 26
intervals directly using a Cox proportional hazards model. The 
results will describe the effects of the covariate independent variables  
in terms of a ‘hazard rate’, which is defined as the instantaneous 
probability of the event in question (in this case a birth), and is 
therefore directly related to the length of the birth interval. As the 
model is intended to reveal differences in spacing behavior, only 
closed birth intervals are used. The formulation of the birth interval 
model follows previous analyses by Alter (1988), Bengtsson and 
Dribe (2006), Van Bavel (2004a, 2004b) and Van Bavel and Kok 
(2004). After consideration of the varying inclusion of demographic 
factors in these studies, it was decided to concentrate on those 
factors most commonly found to affect the birth interval. This was 
done with the aim of producing a parsimonious model which could 
capture the wealth effects (if any) on the duration of the birth 
interval. The demographic factors included were the age of the 
mother (in 5 year age bands), the duration of the marriage, parity, 
and the life status of the previous born child. In common with the 
analysis by Bengtsson and Dribe, I include shared frailty at the 
individual level to control for unobserved family-specific 
heterogeneity in the sample (2006 p.736).  
 
The Cox proportional hazards model is based on the following 
identity: 
 
)exp()()( 0 xththi β ′=  
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Table 9:  Cox Regression on Closed Birth Intervals 
 .coeffe .coeffse p  
Women's Age   
15-19 0.707 0.177 0.166 
20-24 0.976 0.075 0.756 
25-29 (ref.) 1 - - 
30-34 0.920 0.063 0.223 
35-39 0.743 0.071 0.002 
40-44 0.297 0.043 0.000 
45-49 0.043 0.020 0.000 
    
Parity 1.108 0.025 0.000 
Marital Duration 0.906 0.010 0.000 
Infant Alive 0.168 0.015 0.000 
    
Decline Effect 0.868 0.111 0.268 
Main Wealth Effects    
Wealth Group 1 (ref.) 1 - - 
Wealth Group 2 1.221 0.152 0.108 
Wealth Group 3 1.276 0.170 0.067 
Wealth-Fertility Decline 
Interactions 
   
Wealth Group 1 (ref.) 1 - - 
Wealth Group 2 0.716 0.121 0.049 
Wealth Group 3 0.543 0.095 0.000 
    
Frailty variance 0.298 0.050 0.000 
N – Number of birth 
Intervals 
2186 
Likelihood Ratio  2χ 83.77 0.000 
 
 
The hazard rate  for the  individual is a multiplicative function 
of the baseline hazard  and the regression coefficients, 
h thi
0h xβ ′  
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(Cleves et al 2004 p.147-8). The great advantage of the Cox 
proportional hazard model is that the functional form of  , the 
baseline hazard, is left unspecified. To account for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the individual level a frailty component is included. 
Rewriting the hazard: 
0h
 
)exp()()( 0 xthth ii βα ′=  
 
Where iα represents the shared frailty term, assumed to have 
mean one and a variance estimated from the data (Cleves et al 2004 
p.147-8). This is intended to capture mother specific effects on the 
birth interval, constant across all the covariates. As mentioned, the 
results reported in table 9 are presented as hazard ratios11.  Where the 
reported coefficient equals 1, there is no effect of that variable on the 
hazard of a birth. 
 
The Cox regressions on the hazard of a birth place attach high 
significance to parity, marital duration and the presence of an infant. 
Further, the natural fall off in fecundity is reflected by the falling 
hazard ratios for age groups past the 25-29 reference category. The 
                                                 
11 The critical proportional hazards assumption was tested by analyzing the 
Schoenfeld residuals. Using stata’s spthtest revealed that there was a deviation 
from the proportional hazards assumption in the original formulation of the birth 
interval model (table 9). Variable by variable analysis indicated that the parity, 
marital duration and female age grouping variables were driving this violation of 
the proportional hazards assumption. The analysis was repeated omitting these 
variables and the new wealth coefficients were compared with the original models. 
They were extremely similar in both magnitude and significance. Therefore it was 
decided to report the original model’s results. The proportional hazards 
assumption was also checked graphically using stata’s stphplot command.   
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 Table 10: Net Hazard Ratios and Mean Birth Interval (Months) 
by Fertility Regime and Wealth Group 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non-Decline Villages 
Hazard rate 1.000 1.221 1.276 
Interval 30.60 27.74 27.57 
Decline Villages 
Hazard rate 0.868 0.760 0.602 
Interval 32.08 33.23 36.41 
 
wealth effects are reported as interactions in the regression table. In 
order to calculate the net wealth effects, these values are multiplied, 
producing the values reported in table 10. The wealth effects are 
large. For the non-decline villages, the hazard ratio for a birth increases 
with the wealth category, indicating that the top 2 wealth groups 
have significantly shorter birth intervals than the poorest group. For 
the decline villages, the opposite is true. The richest here have much 
longer birth intervals than the poorest group. The mean birth 
interval for each wealth group varies with the hazard rates, and are 
also reported in table 10. These results strongly indicate that spacing 
played a substantial role in the declining fertility of the richer groups 
in the sample. In comparison with the Coale-Trussell measures and 
the age at last birth calculations, it appears that it was spacing, not 
stopping, which was the primary driver behind the French fertility 
decline. 
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Figure 6: The Age Pattern of Marital fertility for Rich and Poor 
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Figure 6 illustrates the age pattern of marital fertility for the 
richest and poorest groups in both fertility regimes (the top and 
bottom thirds of the wealth distribution respectively). As the Coale-
Trussell estimates indicated, the age pattern of marital fertility does 
not vary to a large extent between these sub-groups. However, the 
level of the fertility rate at each age group varies enormously. There 
is a large positive ‘upward shift’ in the age fertility schedule between 
the poorest and richest wealth groups in the non-decline villages. For 
the decline villages, this shift is downward. The Cox model reveals 
that the lower cross-sectional fertility of the richer groups in the 
decline villages is overwhelmingly a result of spacing practices. This is 
also implied by figure 6, where the level of fertility at each age group 
is significantly lower for the richest group in the decline villages. 
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 Section 5: Why did fertility decline in France? 
 
Any socioeconomic explanation for early French fertility decline 
must consider that England, with a higher level of GDP per capita, a 
smaller agrarian sector and a larger urbanization rate lagged behind 
French fertility trends by over 100 years. This fact undermines 
demographic transition theory, the microeconomic theory of fertility 
and unified growth theory12. All of these theories rely on changes in 
income, modernization and the labor force structure of the economy 
in initiating a substitution of child quantity for quality. None of them 
can explain why France was first. 
 
The French themselves have long been preoccupied with the 
unusual characteristics of their demographic history. An intellectual 
climate obsessed with depopulation and the decline in French 
fertility arose around the turn of the 20 century. Van de Walle briefly 
discusses this mostly forgotten literature, criticizing its “outdated and 
weak statistical content”, and states that the work amounted to a no 
more than a series of hypotheses (1974 p.6). Some of these 
hypotheses have survived to today, and I focus upon those 
forwarded by Tony Wrigley and David Weir13. 
                                                 
12 At least in explaining the fertility transition. 
13 Another popular explanation for the French fertility decline is the change in the 
inheritance laws which accompanied the Revolution. The Napoleonic code 
replaced primogeniture with equal partition. In order to preserve a concentration 
of wealth within the family, parents now had to curb their family size, as wealth 
could not solely be assigned to the eldest male. Chesnais questions this 
interpretation by pointing out that other countries adopted the same principles but 
didn’t experience a fertility decline. Further, primogeniture was not practised 
widely in the North, except amongst the aristocracy, and the South-West of 
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 Neo-Malthusian Explanation 
 
Wrigley sees the early adoption of family limitation in France as 
“a variant form of the classic prudential system of maintaining an 
equilibrium between population and resources to which Malthus 
drew attention”. Essentially, the preventative check now operated 
through marital fertility directly, and not indirectly through age at 
marriage. The net reproduction rate in France from the late 18th to 
late nineteenth century was always close to 1, suggesting that the 
population was still finely constrained by available resources (Wrigley 
p.55 1985).  As previously mentioned, almost 80% of the French 
population were rural, and nearly 70% lived off farming at the time 
of the decline (Chesnais 1992 p.335). Chesnais also points out that 
“farming remained primitive” and that there were numerous 
indicators of overpopulation (such as increase in wheat prices from 
the 1760s-1820s) (1991 p.336). These features certainly lend 
themselves to a Malthusian interpretation of the fertility pattern. 
 
The testable implication of this hypothesis, as stated by Weir, is 
that there should be a strong positive relationship between real 
income and fertility (1984a p.31). However, this ‘neo-Malthusian’ 
reasoning for the early decline for French fertility fails to be 
supported by the individual level data collected in this analysis. If the 
restriction on births was a response to an economic constraint, we 
                                                                                                        
France, where primogeniture was common,  had relatively low fertility in the 
Ancien Regime, and followed the same fertility pattern elsewhere post Revolution 
(1991 p.338).  
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would expect those closest to subsistence to initiate fertility control. 
This is clearly not the case for the four villages in the sample. Where 
fertility is declining, the wealth-fertility relationship is negative. 
Fertility decline here is more pronounced for the richer groups; they 
are the first to employ this new variant of the preventative check, but 
this is not a ‘neo-Malthusian’ response. 
   
The Revolution 
 
Many scholars (Weir 1984b, and more recently Murphy and 
Gonzalez-Bailón 2008) have explicitly linked the Revolution to the 
fertility decline. At a superficial (and highly aggregated) level, the 
events are near simultaneous (see figure 1). However, econometric 
tests on the aggregate fertility rate place the decline in fertility before 
the Revolution (1776, see Cummins 2009). Further, it is widely 
accepted that many localities began their fertility transition long 
before 1789 (Chesnais 1992 p.338). In the data collected for this 
analysis, Rosny and Cabris have substantially declining fertility rates 
before the Revolution (see figure 3). However, the ideological and 
socioeconomic causes of the Revolution were germinating long 
before 1789. Could these forces have also contributed to the fertility 
revolution as well as the political? 
 
An economic rationale for the decline in French fertility, 
associated with the Revolution has been forwarded by Weir. He 
states “evidence on fertility by social class is scarce, but tends to 
support the idea that fertility control was adopted by an ascendant 
“bourgeois” class of (often small) landowners“ (1984b p.613). The 
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Revolution enabled an element of the rural population to increase 
their control over the land, while others lost out and became more 
reliant on wage labour. For the new rural bourgeoisie, children 
became “superfluous as labourers and costly as consumers” (Weir 
1984b p.613). The decline of fertility in France in the early to mid 
19th century was primarily due to the decline of the demand for 
children by this new class. It was only after 1870 when France joined 
the rest of Europe in a fertility transition which transcended the 
social order (Weir 1984b p.614).  
 
The results of this analysis support Weir’s hypothesis on the French 
fertility transition. The new class of landowners created by the 
Revolution would certainly lie within the top wealth category as 
constructed here. The results clearly show, as Weir expected, that 
fertility decline was initiated by this wealthy group. Further, the 
effect of the Revolution on family size is large, negative and 
significant (see table 11). This is captured in the negative binomial 
regressions by coding a categorical variable for those who married 
after 1789. A more precise testable implication of Weir’s hypothesis 
is that those who have greater property wealth should have the 
lowest fertility. Further, the cash component of total wealth at death 
should be an insignificant predictor for family size.  By splitting the 
wealth measures into the property and cash components we can test 
for this in the sample data. Once the value is separated, the 
distribution is split into even thirds with respect to cash and property  
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Table 11: Negative Binomial Regressions on Children Ever 
Born with the Components of Wealth 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Demographic variables  
Age at Marriage, Female -0.036*** (0.005) 
Age at Death, Female 0.034*** (0.004) 
Proportion of children dead 0.305** (0.102) 
Event variables  
Revolution -0.127* (0.052) 
Napoleonic Wars -0.008 (0.054) 
Property Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 -0.000 (0.055) 
Wealth Group3 -0.157** (0.058) 
Cash Wealth Effects  
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 0.024 (0.057) 
Wealth Group3 0.053 (0.061) 
  
Constant 0.948*** (0.243) 
N 372 
Pseudo R2 0.069 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at.05% level 
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separately14. Table 10 reports the results of a negative binomial 
regression, similar to the previous exercise, but this time dividing 
wealth into its constituent parts. 
 
The results agree exactly with Weir’s predictions. The wealth 
category which has significantly fewer children is composed of the 
richest property owners. However, the driving factor in his 
hypothesis is the changing cost of children, due to the substitutability 
of wage labor by poorer socioeconomic groups. This does not 
uniquely identify a particular French characteristic as this process 
must surely have been existed in other countries. At this time, the 
English population was far less reliant on the agricultural sector and 
children must have been as expensive, if not more so, as they were in 
France.  
 
In France, however, serfdom had disappeared by the 18th 
century, and most peasants owned their own land, in contrast to 
most of Europe (Chesnais 1992 p.336). The fertility decline 
                                                 
14 The division for property was all those with 0 value at death in group 1, all those 
with property over 0 and less than 2000 Francs in group 2, and all those with over 
2000 Francs property wealth going to group 3. For cash, all those with 0 wealth at 
death were designated to group 1, those with over 0 and under 155 Francs in 
group2, and all those over 155 in group 3. The following matrix describes the 
relationship between the various groups in terms of observations:  
 Cash Wealth Group 
Property Wealth Group 1 2 3 Total 
1 154 45 12 211 
2 59 85 60 204 
3 39 33 135 207 
Total 252 163 207 622 
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originated amongst the wealthiest of this property holding class15. 
According to Chesnais, almost 63% of the population was 
represented by landowners and their families in 1830 while the 
comparable figure for Britain is 14% (1991 p.337). The widespread 
ownership of land amongst the rural population is a unique feature 
of the French socio-economic landscape at this time. Because of this, 
economic inequality was lower in France than in England during the 
19th century (Piketty et al. 2006 p.250). This implies that the 
environment for social mobility was more fluid in 18th and 19th 
century France than anywhere else in Europe. Arsene Dumont, 
writing a century after the onset of the transition, placed social 
mobility as the ‘raison de etre’ of the French fertility decline and 
termed “social capillarity” as the phenomenon driving the limitation 
of family sizes (Dumont 1890). The Revolution served “to increase 
the thirst for equality and stimulate the social ambition of families, 
both for themselves and their progeny” (Chesnais 1992 p.334). The 
old social stratifications under the Ancien Regime, where hereditary 
rights had determined social status, were weakened by the 
Revolution. All of this served to facilitate individuals’ social 
ambition, and the limitation of family size was a tool in achieving 
upward social mobility16. This phenomenon, while associated with 
the Revolution, originated before the political climax of 1789. 
                                                 
15 In aggregate terms. The nobility restricted their fertility far earlier than the rest of 
the population, see Livi Bacci 1986. 
16 Recently, the issue of social mobility and relative status in understanding 
Europe’s fertility decline has been coming to the fore. Skirbekk (2008) and Van 
Bavel (2006) discuss the issue explicitly. Van Bavel (2006) finds a negative 
relationship between family size and children’s subsequent socioeconomic status 
(p.15) and suggests that these intergenerational motivations may be important in 
understanding the fertility transition (p.16).  
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 The testable proposition of this hypothesis is that fertility 
should be negatively related to the opportunities for social mobility. 
A crude proxy for the social mobility environment is the level of 
economic inequality. In a society with a large rural, landless majority 
and a small group of elites, the prospects for social mobility are 
limited. It makes no sense to control fertility if family size has no 
impact upon a family’s relative social standing. The economic 
distance between the bottom and the top status groups is too great, 
and therefore upward social mobility is unattainable for the majority 
of the population. However, changes in the distribution of 
wealth/income between groups in the population reflect a changing 
environment for the possibility of social mobility. As economic 
inequality declines, fertility is induced to decline also, as parents now 
realize that social mobility is possible and the prospects for it are 
affected by family size.  
 
One way to evaluate the strength of this hypothesis is to 
examine the level of economic inequality in cross section in the 
individual wealth data collected for transition era France. Table 12 
reports gini coefficients based on total real wealth, by village, for the 
sample. The levels of inequality are very high, and typical of the pre-
industrial era. For the villages where fertility is declining, the gini 
coefficient is significantly lower than where it is not. This suggests 
that the level of inequality was associated with the onset of the 
fertility transition.   
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Table 12: Gini Coefficients by Village 
 
Gini Coefficient 
(based on deaths 1810-1870) 
Non-decline Villages 
St Paul .861 
St Chely .818 
Decline Villages 
Cabris .705 
Rosny .722 
 
Another way to test the social mobility environment is to 
examine the relationship between father and son’s wealth at death. 
Where the environment for social mobility is more open, father’s 
wealth should have less importance in the determination of son’s 
wealth, than would be the case where social mobility is limited. For a 
very small subsample, I was able to investigate this relationship. 
Table 13 reports the results of an OLS regression on son’s wealth, 
with father’s wealth as an independent variable.  
 
Where fertility is high and not declining, father’s wealth is a 
highly significant predictor of son’s wealth. This relationship appears 
to be far weaker where fertility is declining. The effective coefficient 
on father’s wealth in the determination of son’s wealth in these decline 
regimes is one quarter of that of the villages where fertility is 
stagnating (.864 vs. .195). When both father and son’s family size are 
controlled for, the coefficient on father’s wealth in the non-decline 
villages is ten times its corresponding value in the decline villages (.798  
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Table 13: Father’s Wealth as Determinant of Son’s Wealth 
 
Decline Regime Villages 56.56* 
(24.47) 
35.42 
(33.89) 
Fathers Wealth (Sqrt) 0.864*** 
(0.177) 
0.798*** 
(0.210) 
Fathers Wealth*Decline Regime -0.669* 
(0.305) 
-0.724* 
(0.349) 
   
Son’s Family Size  -3.761 (3.854) 
Father’s Family size  -3.300 (3.394) 
   
Constant 2.13 
(20.99) 
62.38 
(52.38) 
Observations 42 40 
Adj. 2R  0.346 0.320 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at.05% level 
  
 
vs. .074). This result strongly implies that the strength of the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth, it’s ‘stickiness’ within 
families, and the social mobility environment this implies, is 
associated with the presence of fertility decline. 
 
As I have stated before, demographic transition theory, the 
microeconomic theory of fertility and unified growth theory cannot 
explain why French fertility fell first in Europe because they all 
predict that fertility should have declined in England before 
anywhere else. Wrigley’s neo-Malthusian response cannot be valid as 
it was the richest groups who reduced their fertility, and Weir’s 
explanation, again, does not uniquely identify France. What was 
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unique to France was the pattern of landholding and relative 
affluence (to the rest of the world). There are many good reasons to 
suspect that social mobility may be a factor behind the decline. The 
level of inequality and the perseverance of wealth within families, 
both highly related to the social mobility environment were both 
found to be negatively associated with the presence of declining 
fertility.  
  
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
Through linking the Henry demographic dataset to individual 
measures of wealth, the socioeconomic correlates of the fertility 
transition have been examined in this paper. The principal result is 
the major shift in the wealth fertility relationship at the individual 
level. Where fertility is high and non-declining, this relationship is 
positive. Where fertility is declining, this relationship is negative. It is 
the richest groups who reduce their fertility first. This result 
contributes to a revisionist interpretation of the European fertility 
decline. In opposition to the EFP’s conclusions, this disaggregated 
analysis finds strong socioeconomic correlates for the decline of 
fertility in France. The second principal result of this paper is that 
spacing strategies, as opposed to stopping strategies, played the 
strongest role in achieving a lower family size for the richest groups, 
for the villages where fertility was declining. Thirdly, existing theories 
on why fertility declined in France failed to be supported by the 
empirical data collected. However, a fresh look at an old hypothesis, 
does receive some support. Social mobility, as proxied by the level of 
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inequality in the villages and the perseverance of wealth within 
families, is strongly associated with fertility decline.  
 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that socioeconomic 
status mattered during the early French fertility decline but cannot, 
of course, claim to have cracked one of the greatest unsolved puzzles 
in economic history. The root causes behind the World’s first fertility 
decline are still poorly understood. It is perhaps time to reassess 
conceptual models of the fertility transition. Empirically, a 
comparative analysis with other European countries based upon 
detailed individual level information can hopefully illuminate the 
mystery of the early French fertility decline. This study is a first step 
towards re-establishing the French experience as paramount in our 
understanding of Europe’s demographic transition. 
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